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I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once stated that "[t]he propriety
of a lawyer serving as a member of the Board of Directors of his corporate
client remains, even today, a vexing problem of professional responsibil-
ity."1
Historically, accountants have been assumed, as well as required, to be
independent of any enterprise in which they express an opinion regarding
* Partner, Hahn Loeser & Parks, Cleveland, Ohio; Adjunct Professor, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University; Dartmouth College, B.A. Degree,
1956; Harvard Law School, J.D. Degree, 1959.
**Partner, Hahn Loeser & Parks, Cleveland, Ohio; Adjunct Professor (1985), Univer-
sity of Dayton Law School; Purdue University, B.S. Degree, 1973; Georgetown University
Law Center, J.D. Degree, 1976; Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M. in Taxation,
1980.
1 Stewart, Professional Ethics for the Business Lawyer: The Morals of the Market Place,
31 Bus. LAW. 463, 464 (1975).
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the enterprise's financial statements. Independence had been interpreted
to mean that accountants may not serve on the board of directors or
invest in any enterprise which they, or their firm, audit, or for whom
either expresses an opinion on the enterprise's financial statements. By
contrast, attorneys have been counsel to an enterprise, have served as
officers and directors, and have invested in the enterprise. There is no
prohibition against such a relationship in the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the
American Bar Association ("ABA").
Over a period of years, there has been increasing pressure and
commentary regarding the need for attorneys to move in the direction of
accountants' independence by not serving as board members in an
enterprise for which they act as counsel.
The purposes of this article are to: (1) compare and contrast the
difference between the accounting and the legal profession's self-reg-
ulation of board membership; (2) analyze the trend towards requiring
more independence of attorneys as it relates to simultaneously providing
legal advice to a client and serving on the client's board of directors; and
(3) predict the future trends regarding attorneys serving as directors of
clients.
II. PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF THE CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Accountants
Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Ethics for certified public accoun-
tants states:
A member or a firm of which he is a partner or shareholder shall
not express an opinion on financial statements of an enterprise
unless he and his firm are independent with respect to such
enterprise. Independence will be considered to be impaired if, for
example . . . B. During the period covered by the financial
statements, during the period of the professional engagement, or
at the time of expressing an opinion, he or his firm
1. Was connected with the enterprise as... a director or officer
or in any capacity equivalent to that of a member of management
or of an employee ... .2 [emphasis added]
Ethics Ruling 153 provides that a member who has withdrawn from his
2 CODE OF PIROFESSIONAL ETHics ET § 101 (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants 1983).
' AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHiCS,
Ruling 15 (1984). Ethics rulings consist of formal rulings issued by the AICPA's Profes-
sional Ethics Division Executive Committee after exposure to state societies and state
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firm and become an officer and director of several corporations audited by
the firm, but who still maintains an office in the firm and continues to
perform services for the firm for which he is compensated, will adversely
affect the independence of the firm.
Another ethical ruling provides as follows:
When a CPA expresses an opinion on financial statements, not
only the fact but also the appearance of integrity and objectivity
is of particular importance. For this reason, the profession has
adopted rules to prohibit the expression of such an opinion when
relationships exist which might pose such a threat to integrity and
objectivity as to exceed the strength of countervailing forces and
restraints. These relationships fall into two general categories:
(1) certain financial relationships with clients and (2) rela-
tionships in which a CPA is virtually part of management or an
employee under management's control. 4
The authors of Principles of Auditing have stated:
If auditors owned shares of stock in a company in which they
audited, or if they served as members of the Board of Directors,
they might subconsciously be biased in the performance of
auditing duties. A CPA should therefore avoid any relationship
with a client which would cause an outsider who had knowledge
of all the facts to doubt the CPA's independence. It is not enought
that CPA's be independent; they must conduct themselves in such
a manner that informed members of the public will have no
reason to doubt their independence. 5
A relevant regulation issued by the Securities Exchange Commission
states:
The Commission will not recognize any certified public accoun-
tant or public accountant as independent who is not in fact
independent. For example, an accountant will be considered not
independent with respect to any person or any of its parents, its
subsidiaries, or other affiliates . . . (2) with which, during the
boards. These rulings summarize the application of the Rules of Conduct and Interpretation
to a particular set of factual circumstances. Members of the AICPA who depart from such
rulings and similar circumstances will be requested to justify such departures.
' AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ET
§ 52.10 (1986). ETs are concepts of professional ethics which are philosophical essays
approved by the professional ethics division of the AICPA. ETs suggest behavior which
CPA's should strive for beyond the minimum level of acceptable conduct set forth in the
Rules of Conduct and are not intended to establish enforceable standards.
5 W. MEIGS, E. LARSON & R. MEIGS, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 23 (6th ed. 1977).
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period of its professional engagement to examine the financial
statements being reported on, at the date of his report, or during
the period covered by the financial statements, he, his firm, or a
member of his firm was connected as a director, officer or
employee. 6
Over the past five to ten years, Congress, the Securities Exchange
Commission and many commentators have begun to question the inde-
pendence of accountants who perform non-audit services for a client in
addition to audit services. There is a concern that significant fees from
non-audit services, such as management advisory services performed by
the accounting firm, may destroy the actual independence or the appear-
ance of independence of the auditor. 7 However, at the present time there
is no blanket prohibition against accountants providing both audit and
non-audit services for a client.8
B. Attorneys
Rule 1.7 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provides that:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the. representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the represen-
tation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents
after consultation .... 9
The Comments to the ABA Model Rules state:
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a
member of its board of directors should determine whether the
responsibility of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be
called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of
6 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b)(1986).
7 See R. GORMLEY, THE LAW OF ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES
2-32 (1981); Pany & Reckers, Auditor Independence and Nonaudit Services, 2 J. AcCT. &
PUB. POL'y 43 (1983). (See also the bibliography at the end of the article); Pearson,
Categories of Independence: How Does Your Firm Measure Up?, 150 J. ACCT. 39 (1980);
Shockley, Independence and MAS, Four Basic Questions, 39 Oino CPA J. 157 (1980).
' Cowen, Nonaudit Services: How Much Is Too Much?, 150 J. ACCT. 51 (1980). However,
when the SEC issued ASR No. 264 which expressed concern about auditor independence
where the auditor also performed non-audit services, the AIRCPA felt that indirectly the
SEC was prohibiting the performance of non-audit services. News Report, Institute
Questions SEC's ASR No. 264 on Non-audit Services, J. ACCT., Sept. 1979, at 7; SEC Issues
Release on Auditor's Independence, 51 J. TAx'N 155 (1979); Walker, SEC Commentary, 50
CPA J. 174 (1980). ASR No. 264 was subsequently rescinded.
' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
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the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency
with which such situations arise, the potential intensity of the
conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and
the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from
another lawyer in such situations. If there is a material risk that
the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a direc-
tor.10
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
DR 5-105. Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the
Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Profes-
sional Judgment of the Lawyer.
A. A lawyer should decline proffered employment if the exer-
cise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him
in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C).
B. A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the
exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a
client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his represen-
tation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C).
C. In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can
adequately represent the interests of each and if each consents to
the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of
such representation on the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of each."
Basically, the ethical decision as to whether an attorney should serve
on the Board of Directors of a client is left to the discretion of the
attorney.
10 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 Comment (1984).
1 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-105 (1980). The ABA replaced the
Model Code with the Model Rules in 1983. However, most states are still modeled after the
Model Code. "DR" stands for Disciplinary Rules, which are mandatory rules that state a
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action. "EC" stands for ethical considerations which are aspirational in
character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive. The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is modeled after the ABA Model Code.
DR 5-105 of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility is very similar to the rule cited in
the text.
1987]
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At the Airlie House Conference on "Ethical Responsibilities of Corpo-
rate Lawyers" the participants considered proposing lmendments to the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility to prohibit an attorney from
serving as a director of a client. However, no action was taken.' 2
C. Comparison of Professional Regulation of
Attorneys and Accountants
Recognizing the need for total independence in the accountant's expres-
sion of opinion on the client's financial statement, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has prohibited an accountant
from serving as a director of a client which he or his firm audits.'3 There
is no discretion left to the accountant to judge whether or not his
independence will be adversely affected. 14
However, the ABA has not seen fit to impose a mandatory prohibition
against attorneys serving as directors of clients. Some commentators feel
that there is just as great a need for complete independence of an attorney
in the expression of a legal opinion on his or her client's actions as for an
accountant's opinion on a financial statement.' 5
Proponents of attorney-directors do not agree that attorneys have the
same need for independence as do accountants. They note that a CPA
must maintain total independence in order to give a disinterested opinion
on the client's financial statements. However, an attorney serves many
roles for a client by supplying legal advice to management on proposed
actions and by helping design corporate action to comply with the law, in
addition to rendering opinions. 16 The corporate attorney has the duty to
represent his or her client diligently as an advocate.1 7 Thus, the dual role
of an attorney as advisor and advocate is much different than a CPA's
singular role as an independent auditor, such that the attorney should
not be limited to the relationship with the client in the same manner as
the accountant.18
12 See Mundheim, Should Code of Professional Responsibility Forbid Lawyers to Serve
on Board of Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel, 33 Bus. LAW. 1507 (1978); See also
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1620 (rev. ed. 1978). The Guidebook
notes that the issue of whether or not an attorney should serve on the client's board is not
addressed.
' Riger, The Lawyer-Director-"A Vexing Problem", 33 Bus. LAW. 2381, 2386 (1978).
14 But see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text which discuss non-audit services and
independence. In this area, it appears to be up to the discretion of the accountant to
determine independence.
15 See supra note 7.
15 Quiat & Stephens, The Dual Role of Corporate Counsel Serving on the Board of
Directors, 13 COLO. LAW. 792 (1984)(attorneys who perform securities work for a client may
have less of an advocate role).
17 Id. at 795.
"s Id. at 796.
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III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY-DIRECTOR
Proponents of allowing attorney discretion in serving as director of a
client note the advantages to be:
(1) by serving as director, the attorney obtains increased knowledge of
the client's business, thus enabling the attorney-director to give more
meaningful legal advice;
(2) the attorney-director is able to practice preventive law by learning
of contemplated actions at an earlier stage than if he or she were not a
member of the board;
(3) an attorney-director has direct communications with board mem-
bers;
(4) an attorney's familarity with a client's business, expertise and
analytical skills will enable the attorney-director to function as an
excellent monitor of management;
(5) an attorney-director has greater status, which gives more authority
to his or her legal advice; and
(6) due to the attorney's greater risk of liability as a director, he or she
will be more alert and diligent than otherwise. 19
Commentators have noted however, that if an attorney attended board
meetings in the capacity of counsel without serving as a director, he or
she would still be able to obtain many of the same benefits of an
attorney-director. A few examples of these benefits are i) increased
knowledge of the client's business, ii) the ability to practice preventive
law by learning of contemplated board actions in their infancy, and iii)
direct communications with directors.20 In addition, close corporations
rarely hold board meetings with the formality of public companies. Thus,
there is even less need for the attorney to serve as a director of a close
corporation. Additionally, an attorney serving as a director of a non-
client could provide many of the same advantages as the attorney of the
client serving as a director. The attorney serving as a director of the
non-client can ascertain legal problems in any contemplated action by
the board and provide the same analytical skills as counsel to the client.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF ATrORNEY-DIRECTOR
Opponents of attorneys serving as directors of clients note that signif-
icant problems arise as a result of the dual role. Set forth below is a
"9 See Quiat & Stephens, supra note 16, at 797-98; Sloter & Sorenson, Corporate Legal
Ethics An Empirical Study: The Model Rules, The Code of Professional Responsibility and
Counsel's Continuing Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CoRP. L. 601 (1983);
Thurston, Corporate Counsel on the Board of Directors: An Overview, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 791
(1980).
20 Thurston, supra note 19, at 827.
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discussion of some of the difficult situations faced by the attorney who is
also a director of a client. 21
A. Who is the Client?
Who is the client of the corporate attorney-the directors, management
or the stockholders?
EC 5-18 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility states that
corporate counsel owes allegiance to the entity, not to a stockholder,
director, officer or employee. 22 Some commentators assert that the
shareholders are the real clients of the corporate attorney.23 Other
commentators feel that the entity is represented by the board of directors,
and thus the attorney's client is the board.24 Finally, some commentators
feel that management is the client. 25 A survey by Sloter and Sorenson
found that 41% of the attorneys surveyed felt that management was the
real client of the attorney.26
The issue of whether the client of corporate counsel is the corporation,
management, directors or stockholders is beyond the scope of this outline.
In a close corporation, the distinct roles of management, directors and
shareholders tend to be less identifiable. Certainly, as a practical matter,
counsel deals more frequently with management and may tend to
perceive management as the client.27 However, since there is already
significant confusion as to who is the client of the corporate attorney, it
does not seem prudent to add additional confusion by having the attorney
serve as a director of the client.
In contrast to a position as counsel for a corporation, it is clear that a
director has a fiduciary obligation to the company and its shareholders
and not to management. 28
If the view that the board is the attorney's client is correct, the conflict
of an attorney-director is that as an attorney he or she should look to the
board as his client, while as a board member, he or she is the client. The
roles of director and attorney are not identical, and to the extent the one
role is influenced by the other, there is a loss of professionalism, and
ineffective fulfillment of both roles results. 29
2 An excellent article addressing these issues and the conceptual approach to an
analysis of these issues used in this article is set forth in Knepper, Liability of Lawyer
Directors, 40 O11o STATE L. J. 341 (1979).
22 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980).
21 See Sloter & Sorenson, supra note 19, at 632.
24 See Thurston, supra note 19, at 806.
21 See Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality - Ten Years Later, 32 RUrGERS L. REV. 293, 302
(1979); Riger, supra note 13, at 2384.
" See Sloter & Sorenson, supra note 19.
27 See id.
28 Thurston, supra note 19, at 801.
29 id.
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The following are a few examples of such conflict:
Management as Client vs. Shareholders as Client
1. Assume the corporation receives a tender offer. An attorney who
feels the client is management might feel the duty to help management
formulate a plan to defeat the offer, but as a director, with a duty towards
the shareholders, he or she might be obligated to accept the offer.
30
2. One commentator suggests the possibility that an attorney may have
an obligation to report management's dereliction to stockholders despite
any allegiance to his or her position in management as a director. This
might result in an attorney-director disclosing his or her own transgres-
sions as a director. 31
Advocate of Client vs. Impartial Witness
3. There is a possibility that if the individual directors and the
corporation are defendants in the same suit, the attorney-director might
be called as a witness.3 2 The role of the attorney as an advocate for the
client conflicts with the witness's role to state facts objectively.3 3 The
attorney might be in the position of giving testimony on his or her own
behalf that will prejudice the position of his client. Such divergence of
interests will result in possible ineffective advocacy for the client.
34
Attorney's Defense vs. Corporate Defense
4. Where members of the board are defendants, part of their defense
might be reliance on counsel. This would, however, conflict with the
attorney-director's possible defense of reliance on information furnished
by the directors.35
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
"When the attorney and the client get in bed together as business
partners, their relationship is a business relationship not a
professional one, and their confidences are business confidences
unprotected by a professional privilege."36
An attorney who is also a director of a client adversely affects the use
of the attorney-client privilege to the detriment of the corporate client.
Traditionally, courts have assumed, prima facie, that communications to
30 Id.
"' See Knepper, Liability of Lawyer-Directors, 40 OHIo ST. L. J. 341, 344-45 (1979).
32 Thurston, supra note 19, at 801.
3 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1980).
3 See Harrison v. Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 428 F. Supp. 149, 152 (M.D. Pa.
1977); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B)(1980)(A lawyer shall not
accept employment in litigation if he knows he or a lawyer in his firm might be called as a
witness).
3 Thurston, supra note 19, at 801.
36 Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Nev. 1972).
1987]
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an attorney are for legal advice. 37 There is less possibility of this pre-
sumption in situations in which the attorney is also a director of a client. 3s
Consequently, the attorney serving as a director potentially endangers the
availability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation.
Some courts categorize the lawyer either as an attorney or a business-
man based upon the time spent in each capacity. Once the court concludes
that the lawyer functions primarily as a businessman, the attorney-
client privilege is lost.3 9 Other courts will analyze each communication
by counsel to determine whether or not it is legal advice and protected by
the privilege.40
Problems arise when disclosures are made to or by a lawyer-director
during a board meeting. Many commentators believe that legal and
business advice are indistinguishable in this setting, making it difficult
to prove that particular advice is legal advice entitled to the attorney-
client privilege.41 Thus, it will be very difficult to protect the attorney-
client privilege in the situation where the attorney is also a director.
For example, in United States v. Vehicular Parking,42 the defendants in
an antitrust case objected to the admission of communications between
the lawyer-director and themselves. The District Court held that the
memoranda were more like business communications than attorney-
client communications thereby denying the availability of the attorney-
client privilege.43
The fiduciary obligation of the lawyer-director to shareholders will
probably override the attorney-client privilege. This may mean that
memoranda and opinions of the attorney might be treated as
nonprivileged documents provided by a director rather than confidential
advice furnished by a lawyer to a client.44 The potential loss of the
attorney-client privilege is significant enough in itself to support argu-
ments against lawyer-directors.
C. Increased Duty of Care
The Report of the Committee of Corporate laws suggests that "[T]he
special background and qualifications a particular director may possess,
as well as other responsibilities (or their absence) in the management of
the business and affairs of the corporation, may place a measure of
7 Thurston, supra note 19, at 811.
38 Id.
31 Wilezek, Corporate Confidentiality: Problems and Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 7
DEL. J. CORP. L. 221 (1982). See also H. HAYNSWORTH, THE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS OF THE SMALL
BUSINESS LAWYER 31-33 (1984).
40 H. HAYNSWORTH, supra note 39.
41 Id.
42 52 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Del. 1943).
43 Id.
44 Knepper, supra note 30, at 355.
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responsibility upon such director which may differ from that placed
upon another director."45
In Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.,46 an attorney-director was subject
to a suit for damages under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for a
misleading registration statement. The court stated, "[A] director who
possesses some special expertise-such as a lawyer, accountant or real
estate specialist-is expected to apply his expertise to those board
deliberations involving his specialty. '47 Thus, an attorney would be
expected to recognize legal problems and obligations of the corporation
that a non-lawyer director might not be expected to recognize.
For example, in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,48 involv-
ing a 1933 Act registration statement, the court noted that an attorney-
director may be held to a very high standard of independent investigation
because of his or her peculiar expertise and access to information.
In fact, an attorney-director may become so involved in the corporate
affairs that he may be treated as an inside director and a participant in
the transaction. 49 In Feit, the court treated the attorney-director as an
inside director and imposed on the attorney the obligation of reasonable
verification of the facts in the registration statement.5 0
One commentator has concluded that an attorney-director's duty of
care may be far greater than the common law standard of reasonableness
or the standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility. 5 ' The
attorney-director will be expected to be more professional in his work
than would the ordinary director without professional training, and will
have a greater duty of investigation and verification than a non-lawyer.
The knowledge of the attorney-director of the workings of the corpora-
tion, as both an attorney and director, will increase his or her duty of
care. The attorney-director's standard of care will be such care as the
ordinary prudent attorney-director would use under similar circum-
stances.5 2 Thus, the attorney-director, and the law firm5 3 may be subject
to greater liability than if the attorney had avoided the directorship.-4
" Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501, 506 (1975).
4' Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
4' Knepper, supra note 30, at 346-47.
48 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 549 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
41 See Ruder, The Case Against the "Lawyer Director," 30 Bus. LAW. 51, 56 (1975),
5' Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 548.
5 See Knepper, supra note 30, at 348.
a' Ruder, supra note 48, at 55.
53 See text at part IV. G. regarding deputization theory.
51 W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, at 291 (2d ed. 1978).
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D. Auditor's Requests for Information
Auditors of a corporation will request that corporate counsel submit a
letter setting forth potential liability, such as pending or threatened
suits. A lawyer has a duty to advise a client regarding the likelihood that
a claim will be asserted. A director will have a duty to consider the
possibility of the claim's unfavorable outcome and its materiality. Man-
agement must make a decision whether or not to disclose the unasserted
claim to the auditor and its counsel. It is possible that management would
not disclose all information to the attorney, thus relieving the attorney of
the need for disclosure, but the attorney-director might be expected to
know of the contingent claim. Thus, the attorney-director's duty of
disclosure to the auditor may be significantly broadened beyond the
duties imposed upon a corporate lawyer under a statement of policy and
principals issued by the ABA and the AICPA. 55
The lawyer-director, and his or her firm as a control person,5 6 could be
liable for failure to disclose information to the auditor pursuant to a SEC
regulation.5 7 This regulation states that no director shall make a mis-
leading statement or omission to any accountant in connection with an
audit.
The greater duty of disclosure to the auditor imposed on the attorney-
director results in an increased potential liability for counsel and the firm
for responses to an auditor's request for information.
E. Independence
Former SEC Chairman Harold Williams once wrote:
[Tihe lawyer who is also outside counsel to a corporation, along
with investment bankers, commercial bankers, and others who
might be characterized as 'suppliers' to the corporation should be
excluded from board membership... It is important that we come
to grips with the conflict of interest problem created by the board
membership of those whose income, in some significant measure,
depends upon their business dealings with the management; with
the obvious inhibitions on the other members of the board in
terminating or criticizing the service rendered the corporation as
a results of another director's business relationship; and with the
public perception problem created by that conflict.58
5 Knepper, supra note 30, at 349.
5 See text at part IV. G.
7 See 17 C.F.R. 240.13(b)2-2 (1980).
68 Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAw. 7, 10 (1978).
Other Chairman of the SEC have made similar comments. See Handleman, Composition of
the Board of Directors, 4 DEL. J. CorP. L. 770, 774 (1979).
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Mr. Williams recognized the benefits of having the expertise of an
attorney on the board, but felt that the significant conflicts of interest
created by an attorney-director more than offset the benefits. Mr.
Williams also expressed concern that the appearance of the lack of
independence on the board is inconsistent with the need for an indepen-
dent board of directors.
The concern for independence is twofold: independence as an attorney
and as a director. The dual role of the attorney-director may be very
disruptive to the board. The main duty of a director is to use his or her
business judgment in making a decision for corporate action. Counsel
must advise the board and management on the legal aspects of their
actions. It may be very difficult for the attorney to distinguish between
the legal and business basis for any opinions. For example, if he or she
makes a decision as a director to vote for a proposition, he might have
difficulty, as an attorney, persuading the client that a proposal should not
be approved due to the adverse legal consequences. 59 Likewise, if as a
director the attorney votes against a proposition, such action may imply
adverse legal implications.
60
Additionally, the attorney-director's independence as a director could
be compromised. A director is free to disagree, even publicly, with
corporation action, but an attorney must provide necessary legal services
in support of legitimate corporation actions. Thus, the attorney-director's
rights as a director could be limited.6' The attorney-director may lose
independence as a director in order not to antagonize management and
possibly lose a valuable client.62
A director's independence might be questioned if the board is consid-
ering selling a division of the company that has provided significant
business to the attorney's firm.63
If the board is considering action that would entail significant legal
fees, the attorney-director's vote may appear self-serving. Arguably, the
attorney should not be entitled to participate in a business decision that
may result in increased legal fees. Additionally, the board might want to
consider using a different law firm with expertise to handle a particular
matter. However, the board may find it more difficult to switch counsel or
take away some business from counsel where counsel is represented on
the board.6 4
Attorneys should be concerned that the legal profession will be held in
59 See Thurston, supra note 19, at 797.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Engel & Peterson, Considerations for Attorneys Serving as Directors of Corporate
Clients, 12 CoLo. LAW. 1966 (1983).
64 Mundheim, supra note 12, at 1509.
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lower esteem because attorneys are functioning in a situation where their
independence is significantly in question.
F. Close Corporations
The consequences of the attorney-director in a closely-held corporation
may be different than in a public corporation due to the fact that the
management, the directors, and the shareholders may be almost identical
in many situations. 65
The problem of who is the client 66 may not be as difficult since in a
closely-held corporation the shareholders, directors and management
tend to be almost identical. Thus, there should be less concern by an
attorney-director about his dual role. For the same reasons, the indepen-
dence of the attorney-director may not be adversely affected by his role
as a director. In many closely-held corporations, the attorney acts as an
informal director, even if not officially on the board. However, all
closely-held corporations are not alike, and many have shareholders who
are active in management and shareholders who are passive investors,
just as in a publicly held corporation. Then the independence of the
attorney-director and the question of who is the client may be just as
significant as in the publicly-held corporation. Even if all shareholders
are active in management, they may have different interests as employ-
ees versus investors resulting in the need for an independent director.
In a closely-held corporation, the attorney-director will still possibly
have the same increased disclosure requirements to an auditor's request
for information. Additionally, the attorney-client privilege could still be
endangered by the attorney acting as a director of the closely-held client.
If one accepts the concept that attorneys should not be directors of
publicly-held clients, but sees no problem with the one shareholder cor-
poration, the question becomes: where in the spectrum of the one share-
holder corporation to the public corporation does the problem of the at-
torney-director rise to a level requiring the attorney to refuse to
participate on the board of a client? In order to avoid having to determine
at what point a corporation becomes more like a public corporation than
a close corporation, if a general prohibition against attorney-directors
were adopted it should apply to all corporations except a one shareholder
corporation.
Additionally, even if the attorney may properly serve as a director of a
closely-held corporation, if the corporation subsequently issues shares to
new investors or goes public, the attorney may have to resign as a director
after the corporation is no longer closely held. However, many of the
problems discussed earlier will not be eliminated by the attorney's sub-
65 See Salter, Some Comments on Conflicts of Interest and the Corporate Lawyer, 12
COLO. LAW. 60 (1983).
66 See supra part IV. A.
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sequent resignation as a director. The corporation might still lose the
services of the attorney's firm if the attorney is a defendant in a lawsuit
resulting from prior actions as an attorney-director. 67 Also, the attorney-
client privilege for prior actions might still be lost.68 Finally, the attorney
still might have information resulting from his tenure as a director which
will have to be disclosed to the auditor even after the attorney is no longer
the director.69
G. Deputization
In Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,7° the court found that the President
of Martin Marietta, who served on the Board of Sperry Rand Corporation,
was representing the interests of Martin Marietta on the board, and was
liable for short-swing insider profits. In essence, Martin Marietta had
deputized the President to represent it on the Board, and as a result,
Martin Marietta was deemed a director for purposes of the insider trading
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Some commentators have suggested that a law firm could incur
liability from actions of a partner serving as a director of a client under
the deputization theory.71 It is possible that a firm could be liable for
short term trading on a corporate client's stock if a partner served as a
director. Even if the lawyer-director, and not the firm, engaged in short
term trading, the firm might incur liability.
72
There is also a possibility that in the proper case, a law firm could be
held liable for the actions of a partner who is an attorney-director under
either section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 or section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, based on the theory that the firm is a
controlling person of the attorney-director and thus is jointly and
severally liable for the actions of its partner.73
H. Insurance Coverage
Generally, an attorney-director's law firm will have professional
liability insurance for liabilities resulting from professional legal ser-
vices rendered. A corporation will have directors' and officers' ("D&O")
insurance protecting directors and officers from acts performed in their
corporate capacities.' 4
67 See supra part IV. A.
6 See supra part IV. B.
69 See text at part IV. D.
70 Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1036 (1970).
71 See Knepper, supra note 30, at 355; Thurston, supra note 19, at 822.
72 Harris, The Case for the Lawyer-Director, 30 Bus. LAW. 58, 62-63 (1975)(Remarks of
Harris, Hinsey & Ruder).
73 Id. at 71.
71 See generally Hertzberg, Insurers Beginning to Refuse Coverage on Directors, Officers
in Takeover Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 3, col. 2.
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If an attorney-director is held to be a deputy for his law firm, there is
a good possibility that the law firm's professional insurance policy will
not cover liability imposed upon it because of acts of the attorney-direc-
tor in his capacity as a director.75 Since the attorney-director's D&O
insurance would be personal to the attorney-director, any liability of
the firm resulting from the attorney's actions as a director might be
uninsured.
V. STATISTICAL DATA REGARDING TREND AWAY FROM ATTORNEY-DIRECTOR
Based upon a statistical study performed by Baysinger and Butler on
266 major corporations from 1970 to 1980, the authors stated "that the
governance structure of many American business corporations under-
went evolutionary and significant changes between 1970 and 1980."76
The authors concluded that the average board composition appears to
have become more independent. This conclusion is confirmed by a study
performed by Heidrick and Struggles which stated that, in 1982, outside
directors comprised 74% of boards compared to 66% in 1979.77
Under the Baysinger and Butler study it appears that the percentage
of outside attorneys on boards in the survey dropped from 5.2% in 1970 to
4.6% in 1980, a 10% reduction. 78
A 1976 study reported that one out of every six companies filing with
the SEC reported outside counsel serving on their boards, and a 1978
study reported a decline in companies using their counsel as a director.7s
A 1984 Korn-Ferry study of 633 corporate boards reported a decline in
the number of counsel serving as directors of clients.80
VI. PREDICTION
There is presently a trend towards reduction in the number of attor-
neys serving as directors of clients. This trend seems to be fueled by the
practical aspect of increased potential for liability as an attorney-
7 Knepper, supra note 30, at 360.
7 Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI's
Project and the Independent Director, 52 GRo. WASH. L. REv. 557, 568 (1984).
7 HEIDRICH & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA (1982). In this study, an attorney who is a
director for a client would be considered an outside director. A 1984 study made a conclusion
similar to the 1982 study that boards are becoming more independent.
78 Baysinger & Butler, supra note 75, at 571.
79 Id. at 570. The percentages differ from the Baysinger & Butler study cited above since
the Baysinger & Butler study used a smaller sample of corporations and limited the sample
to firms in industry, transportation or distribution.
'o Tarr, Are Board Memberships Becoming Too Risky?, The Nat'l L. J., June 17, 1985,
at 1, col. 3.
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director,"' plus an increasing awareness of the inherent conflict of
interest of an attorney serving as a director of a client.
However, despite this trend, there appears to be only a small possibility
of any change in the near future in the ABA Model Rules or state ethical
codes that would restrict an attorney from serving as a director for a
corporate client. A recent survey indicates that an overwhelming major-
ity of attorneys responding to the survey oppose a complete prohibition in
the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules.8 2 Apparently,
even attorneys who do not support the practice of attorney-directors
support voluntary individual regulation versus a blanket prohibition.
VII. CONCLUSION
Attorneys are beginning to recognize their increased duty of care as
attorney-directors and the increased potential liability resulting from
their dual role. Additionally, law firms may be increasing the firm's
potential liability by having a partner serve as a director of a client.
Increasing numbers of commentators are noting the inherent conflict of
interest of the dual role of the attorney-director and the possible loss of
independence. Additionally, the attorney-director relationship may be
detrimental to the attorney's client by increasing the possibility of the
loss of the attorney-client privilege.
As noted in part VI, there is a trend toward fewer attorneys serving as
directors of clients. This trend should continue over the rest of the decade.
No change is anticipated in the near future in the ABA Model Rules
prohibiting attorneys from serving as directors of clients. However, the
increased awareness of the problems associated with the attorney serving
as a director of a client should result in more attorneys carefully
considering whether or not to serve in that capacity. This heightened
awareness may accelerate the present trend of fewer attorneys serving as
directors of clients.
s' See Schatz, Directors Feel the Legal Heat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985, at 3-12, col. 3.
s2 Eighty-four percent of the attorneys responding opposed a complete prohibition
against attorneys serving as directors of corporate clients in either the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Model Rules. Sloter & Sorenson, supra note 19, at 643.
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